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HASKER’S QUESTS FOR A VIABLE SOCIAL THEORY
Dale Tuggy

In a series of papers, William Hasker, in conversation with important recent
work in philosophical theology, has carefully articulated and argued for a
version of “social” trinitarianism. I argue that this theory should be rejected
because it is not consistently monotheistic.

Introduction
In the last forty years or so, many broadly traditional Christian theologians and philosophers have lined up behind a way of understanding
the Trinity, according to which the “persons” of the Trinity really are
three persons, that is, selves—so many subjects of experience, intentional agents, each with his own intellect and will. In a series of papers,
William Hasker has fought offensively and defensively on behalf of this
“social” trinitarianism (hereafter, ST). He defends ST against many recent objections by philosophical theologians, and argues both that the
genuine Christian tradition requires belief in something like ST and that
ST is what the historical mainstream tradition has always been getting
at. Moreover, he’s authored trenchant critiques of some important rival
approaches.1
Elsewhere I’ve argued that his replies to my deception objections to
ST are completely unsuccessful.2 Here I shall discuss only Hasker’s positive thrusts, his claims about what ST amounts to. I shall argue that any
Christian should reject it, because it implies polytheism (and the falsity of
monotheism).3
1
William Hasker, “Tri-Unity,” The Journal of Religion 50:1 (1970), 1–32; “Has a Trinitarian
God Deceived Us?” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall
and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 38–51; “A Leftovian Trinity,”
Faith and Philosophy 26:2 (2009), 154–166; “Objections to Social Trinitariansm,” Religious Studies 46 (2010), 421–439; “Constitution and the Trinity: The Brower-Rea Proposal,” Faith and
Philosophy 27:3 (2010), 321–329; “How to Think About the Trinity,” in Christian Philosophy of
Religion, ed. Colin Ruloff (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014).
2
Dale Tuggy, “Divine Deception and Monotheism: A Reply to Hasker,” Religious Studies
47 (2011), 109–115. Hasker replies in his “Deception and the Trinity: A Rejoinder to Tuggy,”
Religious Studies 47:1 (2011), 117–120. My “Divine Deception and Monotheism” (unpublished) continues the conversation.
3
There is much confusion about monotheism in the scholarly literatures. By “mono
theism” I shall mean the thesis that there is exactly one GOD. A GOD is the sort of being
which Yahweh is assumed and asserted to be in the Bible. Polytheism is normally taken
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The First Quest
For Hasker the sine qua non of ST is the claim that the “persons” of the
Trinity enjoy genuine personal relationships.4 In a 1970 essay, Hasker says
that he assumes that the “persons” of the Trinity, but not so much the Trinity
itself, are analogous to human persons.5 While not defining the term “person” in the doctrine that God “is three persons,” he specifies that
A person is that which enters into personal relationships. . . . Each Person is to each
Person as an “I” to a “Thou.”6

Hasker asserts that both the Bible and important fourth-century “fathers”
support ST, and he boldly proposes “a reconstruction of the doctrine of
the Trinity developed in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind.”7
This recasting is needed, because
The Fathers may have resolved the problem [of answering the question:
Three what in one what?] for themselves, but they did not resolve it for us.8

Moreover, Hasker wants to answer this question without falling into
tritheism.9 He plausibly argues that a human “person must be regarded as
a continuing [i.e., lasting through time] subject of experiences” which has
a “nature,” which is “the ontological ground” of the person’s dispositions,
and “is the real capacity . . . for having such experiences.”10 His reconstruction, then, is this:
the one individual and indivisible Nature of God is possessed by three Subjects, each
of whom is really distinct from the other two and is the Subject of his own distinct
experiences in the unity of the one divine nature and life.11
to be the thesis that there is more than one god—that is, roughly, more than one self with
supernatural power, and far greater power than any ordinary human. A GOD is necessarily
a god, but not vice-versa; GOD is the more specific concept. As just defined, “monotheism” and “polytheism” are not obviously inconsistent; it seems there could be exactly one
GOD but more than one god. However, in this paper, because of the Christian context, by
“polytheism” I mean the claim that there is more than one GOD. Similarly, “tritheism” shall
mean not that there are exactly three gods, but rather that there are exactly three GODS.
For stylistic reasons, I shall use the conventional “god” to express the GOD concept. And
I shall use the capitalized “God” only when using that word like a proper name and shall
otherwise use “god.” On the god-GOD distinction see my “Divine Deception and Monotheism” (unpublished).
4
“Has a Trinitarian God Deceived Us?” 47 n15; cf. “Tri-Unity,” 4.
5
“Tri-Unity,” 4. However, he proceeds to talk of the Trinity as if it were a self: “suppose . . .
that this triune God desired to reveal himself to men” (5).
6
Ibid., 4, 5, original emphases.
7
Ibid., 3; cf. 31. Hasker’s project here is a clear example of what I elsewhere call the project
of Resolution of an apparent contradiction by Rational Reconstruction of the doctrine. See
my “On Positive Mysterianism,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69:3 (2011),
205–226.
8
“Tri-Unity,” 1.
9
Ibid., 11.
10
Ibid., 22, 24.
11
Ibid., 27, original italics.
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One may ask: why is this not a sort of tritheism, wherein the three gods
happen to share a nature? That they can be said to share “a life” doesn’t
make them one god. Hasker argues that because they share a nature, they
can’t but cooperate, and that they are somehow always involved in each
other’s actions.12 He holds this shared nature not to be a generic or universal one, but a particular one,13 which is a “‘real potentiality’ for the divine
experiences.”14 This, Hasker insists, is “a significant, and not a merely
nominal, affirmation of unity.”15
True enough—nature sharing would be a kind of objective unity. But
why think this implies that those three selves are in or somehow amount
to one god? There’s a dilemma here. Either it is or is not possible for diverse (non-identical) things to share one and the same particular nature,
one and the same individual potentiality for experiences. Suppose that it
is possible: why then think that, because divine persons share a nature,
they are one god? Might not three gods share a nature, just as there might
be Siamese triplets which share, say, a certain bone or organ? On the other
hand, if it is not possible, then it is not actual, nor can it be part of or
implied by any true Trinity theory.
Can an individual property be shared by two or three things? Philosophers fall into four camps on the topic of properties or qualities. Some
deny there are such entities as properties. Others believe in properties,
but only understood as universals. A third group affirms properties, but
only as particulars. Finally, some believe in both particular and universal properties. For the first two groups, it will be a necessary truth that
there are no shared particular properties, because necessarily there are no
such things as particular properties. Members of the third group typically
hold properties to be “necessarily such that they are exhibited by just one
object.”16 And members of the fourth group posit shared properties, but
only universal ones. Presumably, for them as well, in principle there can’t
be a shared particular property. Thus, surveying the theories, if there are
properties, it seems impossible that there be a shared particular property.
In the context of a general metaphysics of properties, no one takes this
option seriously. Is this not a strong reason against any theological theory
positing a shared particular property?
12
Ibid., 27–28, original italics. He says, “Each action of a divine Person takes place in and
by the one Nature of God—in the ‘one mind’ of God, if we may so speak.” (27) I’m not sure how
to take this, or how it could be consistent with his claim that each of the persons has what are
only his own acts, and presumably his own, unshared point of view. (28)
13
“Tri-Unity,” 28.
14
Ibid., 29.
15
Ibid. He also asserts that “When we regard the Persons abstractly, as separated from the
Nature, they are mere abstractions, and cannot be parts of anything; but regarded concretely,
each Person possesses and is the whole indivisible Being [i.e., Nature] of God” (30, original
emphases). I’m not sure what he here asserts, or whether or not it is consistent with his claim
that each Person is a self.
16
Michael Loux, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge,
2006), 73.
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In saying this, I’m thinking of fundamental, basic, or underived
properties, as it were some of the bottom-level metaphysical ingredients of things. But if one has a looser concept of a property, on which a
whole may “borrow” some of its parts’ properties, then one may allow
for shared particular properties. Suppose that human selves are living
organisms, and that conjoined twins are overlapping organisms, physical objects which share certain parts. Now consider conjoined twins who
share a heart. It would be plausible, on these assumptions, that the one
twin’s power of pumping blood just is the other twin’s power of pumping
blood. This would be plausible because each twin has that power just by
having one and the same heart, with, we presume, exactly one bloodpumping power.
I don’t endorse this metaphor of property “borrowing,” and suspect that
such talk confuses properties and predicates. But for present purposes, I’ll
grant that it makes sense in the above case. The persons of the Trinity are
not supposed to share any proper part, so this sort of case neither shows
nor even suggests that it is possible for them to share a particular property.
One may object that it is precisely the doctrine of the Trinity which gives
us reason to believe there can be a shared particular property.17 Maybe
ordinary particular properties can’t be shared, but the divine nature is no
ordinary particular property, and is shared by non-identical entities. And
haven’t great Christian minds, for example, the medieval philosophertheologian Anselm, believed this?18 Moreover, isn’t it just part and parcel
of Christian commitment to believe that this particular property, the divine nature, is shared by non-identical entities?
Taking the last point first: no. There have long been unitarian Christians
(who hold that the one god, God, is numerically identical to the Father, so
that God is, as is sometimes said, “unipersonal,” or more clearly, just is
a certain great self), modalists (who hold that the three “persons” of the
Trinity are not distinct entities, but are rather in some sense ways the one
god is—hence, just one entity has the divine nature), and social trinitarians
who hold the divine nature to be a shared universal property. One might
object that none of these have been in the catholic mainstream, but this is
mistaken—leading catholic intellectuals have held all three views.19
I agree with the objector that knowing a first-rate thinker has believed
something is a reason to believe it, but it is often not, by itself, a sufficient
reason. This is particularly so when it comes down to theses which clash
I thank a reader for this journal for raising these objections, which I have paraphrased.
E.g., Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009), 134–137.
19
By “catholic” I mean Christians within that mainstream, bishop-ruled Christian movement which later split into Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Magisterial Protestant
factions. Here are some eminent catholic thinkers who have held, respectively, the three
positions mentioned: Samuel Clarke and Origen (Anglican, catholic or “proto-orthodox”),
Karl Rahner and Karl Barth (Roman Catholic, Reformed), and Cornelius Plantinga and John
Philoponus (Reformed, Orthodox).
17
18
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with our fundamental intuitions. Most of us have this intuition: if there’s
such a thing as this property: this paperclip’s flexibility, that individual power
or disposition couldn’t also be had by another paperclip. And changing
to mental properties: My individual ability to empathize couldn’t also be
had by you. Consider now Hasker’s suggestion that the Father’s ability to
experience just is the Son’s ability. That the subject has shifted to spirits,
or to divine selves, seems irrelevant, for this scenario seems impossible as
strongly as does the paperclip scenario. The point seems to hold generally
for any property which is particular and not universal (again, assuming
that there are properties).
Thus, the burden is on trinitarians who posit a shared individual divine
nature, to give us a reason, other than that their theory requires it, for
thinking that it is even possible for a individual property to be had by more
than one entity. Until they do this, their claim that an individual divine
nature is shared is not well motivated.
As for Anselm, insofar as I follow his reasoning, it is that the divine
nature can’t be a shared universal, or else the Trinity would be three gods.
But all properties (so, all natures or essential properties) are either universals or particulars. Therefore, the shared divine nature is a particular
property. The best recent commenters on Anselm note that he simply
doesn’t have developed views about universals, and this is probably why
he never considers objections like the one just given.20 I suggest that in
the light of nine hundred more years of philosophizing about properties,
more must be said, and account must be taken of the fact that when not
defending Trinity theories, seemingly no philosopher takes seriously the
idea of a fundamental shared particular property.
Note that if this intuition is correct (that it is impossible for distinct things
to share a fundamental particular property), then any “two” things sharing
any fundamental particular property (nature or not) must be numerically
one. This explains why many trinitarians assume that if, e.g., the Father and
Son share a particular nature, then they must be one being. Indeed, that is
so. But that is to say that they are numerically one being, that they are
numerically identical. That “nature” is very ambiguous helps to hide this
implication of the claim. It appears, then, that we can answer the question
above, as to why there couldn’t be three gods sharing a particular nature.
The answer is that if things share a particular fundamental property of any
sort, this implies that they are a single thing. On the imagined scenario, the
“three” gods would actually be one god, and one entity/being.
Does this insight doom any Trinity theory? Not necessarily. Recently,
philosophical theologians have floated the idea that the divine nature is
a property, but is neither a universal property nor a particular property.21
Visser and Williams, Anselm, 254.
See Michael Rea, “Hylomorphism and the Incarnation,” in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, ed. Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),
134–152, section 6. Preprint online: http://www.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Hylomorphism%20
and%20Incarnation.pdf; and Michael Rea, “Hylomorphism Reconditioned,” Philosophi20
21

176

Faith and Philosophy

About this, I will only say that if nature-sharing is supposed to explain
why three divine selves are one god, we will have to understand what it is
about this sort of nature (which is neither particular nor universal) which
makes this so.
I conclude that Hasker’s claim that the three divine selves enjoy an
objective sort of unity in the sense that they share an individual power
or capacity needs further support to be plausible. As things stand, the
theory seems a necessary falsehood. Further, we can see why Hasker and
others suppose that individual-nature-sharing would make three divine
selves one god. It would. But it would also make them one being. It is
self-evident that if some x and some y are the same god, then x is a god, y
is a god, and x and y are one and the same (are numerically identical). Yet,
Hasker would agree, the Father, Son, and Spirit can’t be one and the same,
for they have qualitatively differed from one another.
At the end of the essay, Hasker asks “whether ‘personality’ is most correctly ascribed to God in his unity or to the personae individually.”22 He
answers that
The personae are Persons! Each of them is a “he,” and to each Person distinct
divine actions are appropriately ascribed. Yet such is the oneness of the
Godhead [i.e., the divine nature], such is the concurrent, united operation
of all three Persons, that the Three together may be regarded and spoken
of in the singular as “he”—as . . . a single divine “personal society.” Thus,
both the entire Godhead [i.e., the Trinity] and the Persons individually may
be referred to as “he,” but the latter usage must be held to be systematically
and ontologically fundamental.23

In other words, each “person” of the Trinity is a self, and the whole Trinity
is not a self, though it is a single, unified reality, and because the members
of the Trinity are so unified, it can seem like an intelligent agent itself, and
so it can be thought of and spoken of as if it were a self.
Aren’t we advised here to be tritheists, but to soothe our worries by
personifiying this group of three gods, talking about them and thinking
about them as if they were themselves a single god? At the end of his essay,
Hasker admits that
the whole position may be simply dismissed as tritheistic. Our only answer
. . . is that Jesus Christ is presented in the New Testament as one who does
what only God can do, says what only God can say, and is in fact very God
himself in his essential being. And we believe that he is truly so presented.24
cal Perspectives 25 (2012), preprint online: http://nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Hylomorphism%20
Reconditioned.pdf. Similarly, Richard Cross reads one early catholic theologian as holding
that the divine nature is neither concrete nor abstract. (Richard Cross, “Latin Trinitarianism:
Some Conceptual and Historical Considerations,” in Philosophical and Theological Essays on the
Trinity, ed. Thomas McCall and Michael C. Rea [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009],
201–213, 204.)
22
Hasker “Tri-Unity,” 31.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 32.
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The thrust here, clearer in the whole context, is that we ought not let a
priori intuitions about what is impossible or possible prevent us from
believing what has in fact been revealed as actual (and so which must be
possible). This is, I think, an important and correct point to make, but it
isn’t germane here. Suppose it is correct that the New Testament presents
Jesus as being “very God himself.” It might follow that some sort of “high”
two-nature christology is called for (i.e., Jesus is divine, has a divine nature, as much as the Father) but what does this have to do with the worry
about tritheism? Here Hasker only confesses his unshakable confidence
that the mainstream catholic tradition of theology has got the New Testament right, and that the New Testament is reliable in what it says about
Jesus. He tacitly confesses that he has no answer to the tritheism objection.
But a Trinity doctrine is by definition supposed to be monotheistic (and not
also tritheistic).
Thus, though this piece throughout displays the many philosophical
virtues for which Hasker is known, in the end it is a theoretical failure.
He aims for a theory which does not “imply a denial or weakening of
the unity of God.”25 This desideratum is conveniently unclear. But if we
read it as requiring the truth of monotheism and the falsity of polytheism,
Hasker’s theory comes up short.26
The Second Quest
But that is Hasker’s first, not his last discussion of the Trinity. More than
forty years on, Hasker has published the boldly titled “How to Think
About the Trinity.”27 In addition, he’s weighed in with critical comments
on two recent Trinity theories by analytic philosophers, in each case attempting to derive positive lessons about the doctrine. Here I shall weigh
his advice, concentrating on how he construes “the” doctrine itself, leaving aside most of his many methodological points.
The persons of the Trinity are, for Hasker, so many selves. At times he
pulls his punch and describes them more ambiguously as “personal,” “social,” and as “centers of consciousness.” But they stand in non-reflexive
interpersonal relationships to one another and to humans, and this implies
that they are in the final analysis, and after the last nod to analogy, literally
selves.28 While they enjoy perfect fellowship, and act with regard to other
things in a perfectly unified way, these factors alone do not, Hasker plausibly holds, make them a single god.29 Hasker cites three further factors,
Ibid., 31.
See note 3 above on my usage of “monotheism” and “polytheism” here.
27
“How to Think About the Trinity,” in Christian Philosophy of Religion, ed. Colin Ruloff.
28
Hasker, “How to Think About the Trinity,” numbers 2–4. As he says elsewhere, “what
is the nature of the Persons, as ST conceives it? Put simply, the Persons are persons” (“Objections to Social Trinitarianism,” 2).
29
“In order to secure the unity of the Trinity, it is necessary though not sufficient to affirm
that the Persons enjoy with one another the highest conceivable degree of interpersonal or
‘social’ unity as well as functional unity in their dealings with the created world” (“How to
25
26
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which I assume are meant to be jointly sufficient, perhaps together with
the two other features just mentioned, to make the three one god. On the
other hand, it may be that it is really the last claim which is meant by itself
to suffice for their being one god.
First, he endorses the patristic claims that the Son is eternally “begotten”
of the Father, while the Spirit eternally “proceeds” from the Father and the
Son. Hasker notes that such doctrines offer “an explanation of the existence
of more than one divine Person,” and he urges that they have “some scriptural support.” Seemingly conceding that the traditionally cited biblical
proof-texts imply no such claims, he argues that terms such as logos and
“son” are “strongly suggestive of a derivative status for the Son.”30
This may be so, but Hasker makes a big leap in claiming that such
terms give “significant support” for the doctrines in question, for they are
consistent with various subordinationist unitarian theories, such as that
propounded by Origen. On such theories, the one god is identical to the
Father, and the Son exists because of the Father. Though such theories
may allow that the Son is in some sense “divine,” he enjoys this status
because of the Father, who is greater. As Origen says,
some of those among the multitudes of believers . . . because of their rashness suppose that the Saviour is the greatest and supreme God. But we at
least do not take that view, since we believe him who said: “The Father who
sent me is greater than I.”31

Hasker’s main point, though, is just that these claims feature prominently
in the Constantinopolitan Creed; he is unwilling to countenance that these
fourth-century “fathers” could have been off track. Thus, he scolds fellow “social” trinitarians Craig and Moreland for denying the generation
and procession claims. But he doesn’t address their grounds for so doing.
There’s a significant consensus among modern exegetes that no biblical text
either asserts, implies, or assumes the eternal generation and procession
claims.32 And philosophically, it is plausible that these derivation claims
Think About the Trinity,” number 4). I take it that the “unity” in view is the unity possessed
by a single god.
30
“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 5.
31
Origen, Origen: Contra Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 462 [=Book 8, section 14]. For an overview of Origen’s views on the Trinity,
see Alvan Lamson, The Church of the First Three Centuries (London, 1875) , 214–229 (reprint
Toronto: University of Toronto Libraries, 2012).
32
J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 594–595. Moreland and Craig refer to the
discussion and summary in John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton,
IL: Crossway, 2001), 488–492. On this point, some evangelicals are coming around to a point
long ago argued by unitarians—that the traditional proof-texts for the doctrines of eternal
generation and procession have been misread. See, e.g., John Wilson, Scripture Proofs and
Scriptural Illustrations of Unitarianism, 3rd ed. (London, 1846, reprint Morrisville, NC: Lulu
.com, 2007, 190–196). At least one noted nineteenth-century evangelical, trinitarian exegete,
and theologian drew the same conclusion, on the same grounds—divine aseity and lack of
biblical support (Moses Stuart, Letters on the Eternal Generation of the Son of God [Andover,
MA: Mark Newman, 1822, reprint Morrisville, NC: Lulu.com, 2010).
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imply that Christ and the Spirit are not fully divine, since full divinity
requires aseity—not existing because of anything else. On the traditional
generation and procession doctrines, the Father has aseity, but the Son and
Spirit do not. Instead of engaging Moreland and Craig on this interesting
objection (I’m inclined to take their side, that a maximally great being must
exist and have its essential perfections a se) Hasker dismisses this concern
on the grounds that if generation or procession ruled out divinity, then the
Constantinopolitan creed would be inconsistent with itself.33 I take it that
Hasker holds that divine providence would not allow this. But even if full
divinity doesn’t imply aseity, still, one may think that the Father, being the
origin or source or cause of the Son, the one from whom the Son gets his
divine nature, must therefore be greater than the Son—even though the Son
is “true God from true God.”
If we’re worried about how all this counts as monotheism, it’s hard to
see the relevance of affirming generation and procession; for all we know,
if there could be three gods, it could be that they stand in this pattern
of dependence (the second depending on the first, and the third in some
different way depending on both the first and the second, while the first
depends on nothing).
But perhaps these causal or quasi-causal relations are supposed to
work in conjunction with the second factor, namely that the Three share
a single “common nature which is concrete and is numerically one.”34 As
we’ve seen, however, this strategy works too well, for individual-naturesharing seems to imply being numerically one. The problem discussed
above hasn’t been addressed.
Third, Hasker tells us that
The tension of “one” versus “three” is resolved by postulating that there
is in the Trinity a single divine mind with three personal centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will.35

How should we unpack this new claim? Hasker gives two thrusts. First,
he quotes Moreland and Craig, to the effect that the one god is one soul,
but not one person. I just am my soul, and my soul is (identical to) a self/
person, in their view, because it has one set of cognitive (and presumably, active and affective) faculties.36 In contrast, say Moreland and Craig,
God has three such sets of powers, and so in some sense is, in their words
“three centers of self-consciousness, intentionality, and volition.”37 But is
this possible, Hasker asks? Well, we don’t know it to be impossible, he
argues, citing split-brain experiments and victims of multiple personality
disorder.
“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 5.
Ibid., number 6.
35
Ibid., number 7.
36
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 238–239.
37
“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 7.
33
34
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But let’s first return to Moreland’s and Craig’s claim. This soul (an immaterial entity) which is God has three faculties, that is, three general
powers, each of which is sufficient to make it a self.38 This doesn’t make the
soul be three selves; they would agree, I think, that identity is a one-one
relation, so that it is impossible for several distinct things to be identical
to some one thing. Rather, this soul would thereby be just one self whose
self-hood is over-determined. Nor would it follow that this soul somehow
supports or underlies three selves. Suppose Ralph is a rotten husband,
and that he has three tendencies each of which is sufficient to make him
a rotten husband. First, Ralph is habitually unfaithful. Second, Ralph is
a chronic liar. Third, Ralph is a coward. This doesn’t make Ralph three
bad husbands; it makes him a single, triply bad one. His wife need only
divorce one man.
Thus, if it is really God which has these three faculties, e.g., three abilities
truly to think, I suppose in three different ways (whatever that amounts to)
“I exist,” then it does not follow that God “is three persons,” or that he’s in
any sense composed of three selves. What follows is that God is a self, able
to think (etc.) in three different ways, by exercising three different powers.
Moreland and Craig want to say that God “is” three persons in the sense
that God “supports” three persons, as a sort of substratum, but again,
they are his powers, not (merely) the powers of his parts, if indeed the
“persons” should be thought of as parts on their theory. Thus, when they
identify the one God with this aforementioned soul,39 they make God to be
a self after all, but one which can live in three ways. He’s personal, but he’s
also a person (self), albeit an unusual one. Each “person” of the Trinity, on
this theory, would be this one self thinking in a certain way, exercising one
of his three cognitive powers. But this runs contrary to their, and Hasker’s,
claim that the “persons” of the Trinity stand in personal relationships to
one another.40 No self can enjoy an inter-personal (non-reflexive) relationship with himself.
But despite their talk of “God” having three properties sufficient for
personhood, the above can’t be what Moreland and Craig intend; after
all, they deny that God/the Trinity is “a fourth person or agent”—not because God’s the only self in the Trinity, but rather because it (God) isn’t a self
(hence, not a fourth self).41 Perhaps what they want to say is that “God”
38
William Lane Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once More: A Response to Daniel HowardSnyder,” Philosophia Christi 8 (2006), 101–113, see 104–106. (Partially reprinted as “Another
Glance at Trinity Monotheism” in McCall and Rea, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the
Trinity, 126–130, see 130.)
39
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 594; Craig, “Trinity Monotheism Once
More,” 101.58
40
Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 582–583, 588, 594–595.
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is a soul (or at any rate a non-physical substance or entity—“soul” may
be misleading here) with three powers sufficient not for being a self, but
rather, sufficient for somehow containing a “center of consciousness.”42 But are
these “centers” selves or not? If not, the central desideratum of ST isn’t
met, for non-selves can’t be friends. If they are selves, then a ST proponent
who adopts the Moreland-Craig model must think the triune God to be a
complex substance composed of three selves.43 But if they are substances
(or simply concrete, individual entities which are agents, knowers, lovers) they can’t be “in” this one soul in the way that a property is “in” or
“had by” its bearer; each is an entity in its own right. And each being
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent,44 they appear to be so many
gods, just amalgamated into a complex whole thing called “God,” which
isn’t a god, though it has gods as parts. If there can be more than one
god, why can’t they be joined to form some whole? I don’t know; thus, if
this is what Moreland and Craig intend, I don’t know why anyone should
consider it a sort of monotheism.
Daniel Howard-Snyder has pointedly pressed the monotheism objection.45 In reply, Craig asserts that there’s no problem with their ST implying
that God isn’t (identical to) a self, since “That’s part and parcel of Trinitarian orthodoxy.”46 This would come as a shock to contemporary Christian
laypeople and theologians who hold to a one-self understanding of the
Trinity, on which the Trinity just is a certain self, God, who exists (or: acts,
lives, manifests, or reveals himself) in three different ways. It would also
42
Moreland and Craig introduce ST as the view that “in God there are three distinct centers of self-consciousness, each with its proper intellect and will” (Philosophical Foundations,
583). On this reading, their analogy to human souls mentioned above would on their views
be a poor one. They hold to a dualism on which I am numerically identical to a soul. They
say that just as having one set of mental faculties makes my soul (that is, me) one self, God’s
having three such faculties make him three selves. But what that God-soul has three of, they
really want to say, are properties sufficient for not for being, but rather for containing a self. In
contrast, I have no such property; although I’m a self, I don’t contain any selves within me.
43
This is the final option discussed by Craig (“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 113). I’ve
just argued that they are already committed to this; given what else they want to say, it’s the
only option available.
44
“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 110. I take it they are straightforwardly so, and not in
virtue of being parts of a thing (God, the Trinity) which has those features.
45
Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” Philosophia Christi 5:2 (2003), 375–403,
see 401–403.
46
“Trinity Monotheism Once More,” 106. Craig adds that “Monotheists concur that
God is personal, not that He is a person” (ibid.) At first glance, this seems to be an ad hoc,
theory-saving redefinition of “monotheism.” However, it is not only social trinitarians who
understand “God” to be something other than a self. Many medieval theologians, be they
Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, modeled their concept of the ultimate being in large measure
after the neoplatonic “One,” and arguably don’t believe God to be a god (i.e., a perfect self—
that is, a GOD—see note 3 above). On such views God isn’t a self, but is rather “personal,”
self-like in some way, e.g., it appears to us to be a self, it is commonly mistaken for a self, or
self-implying concepts apply only analogously to it. It would appear, then, than Craig is correct, if the term “monotheist” may be understood in sense so broad as to include ST theorists
and medieval theologians, along with the many Jews, Christians, and Muslims who believe
God to be a perfect Self. In my view, what matters to a discussion of the Trinity is what sort of
monotheism the Bible asserts. On this see my “Divine Deception and Monotheism.”
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come as a shock to theologians who were considered within the catholic
fold in the second, third, and fourth centuries, what we now call subordinationists and monarchians, to leave aside the so-called “Arians.”47 These
assumed the one god to be numerically identical to the Father, and at least
in many cases, they held the Father to be a self.
In sum, the Moreland-Craig theory either abandons ST for a one-self
account of the Trinity, giving up the claim that the members of the Trinity
enjoy an ideal friendship, or it is an unappealing tritheism, in which three
gods are parts of a whole, which is dubbed “God,” though it is not itself a
god. But monotheism is the view that there’s exactly one god, not the view
that there’s at least one god-supporting thing (this “soul”). The biblical
God is not a what, but rather a who.48
Hasker ought not claim, then, that Moreland and Craig give us “a helpful
and illuminating statement of the central claim of social Trinitarianism.”49
But let’s move on to the abnormal psychology cases, for Hasker claims
these are somewhat analogous to what he understands the Trinity to be.
So as not to multiply words, I’ll assume the reader is familiar with split
brain and multiple personality disorder phenomena. Hasker urges that
the “most obvious reading of the evidence” is that in either case we have
“a single mind” which contains “two or more centers of consciousness or
psychological subjects.”50 This is of course plenty disputable. But Hasker
doesn’t offer this as a metaphysical model of the Trinity. His sole point is
a defensive one:
[T]he point of the examples is not to show that something precisely analogous to the Trinity exists in ordinary (or even extraordinary) experience. . . .
The point of the examples is a conceptual one, to show that our concepts of
“mind” and “psychological subject” admit (or can be revised so as to admit)
the possibility that a single mind contains two or more such subjects. This
possibility, I maintain, is indeed exhibited in the split-brain and multiple
personality cases.51

47
Late-first to early-second-century catholic “monarchians” claimed to uphold the “monarchy,” the one rule, of the Father, in reaction against subordinationists, whom they accused
of denying monotheism. As we have only the writings of their bitter enemies, it is hard to get
clear on their views, which surely varied in the details. Tertullian accuses them of identifying
Father and Son, and it is possible that some did. But probably some held that the Father just
is the one true God, and the divine element in the man Jesus, the Word, was God or a property or mode of God (cf. John 14:10). “Arians” were so-called by their theological enemies;
they were 4th c. subordinationist theologians who held (as did other catholic theologians
before Origen) that before the creation of the cosmos, God (i.e., the Father) created his Son,
by whom he then created the cosmos (cf. Proverbs 8:22). The claim that Father and Son are
eternally homoousios (one substance or one essence), first voted in by the bishops at Nicea
(325 CE), was meant to exclude them from Catholic Christianity.
48
On this point see Anthony Buzzard, Jesus Was Not a Trinitarian: A Call to Return to the
Creed of Jesus (Morrow, GA: Restoration Fellowship, 2007), 46, and my “Divine Deception
and Monotheism.”
49
Hasker, “How to Think About the Trinity,” number 7.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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His point, then, is that a certain supposition isn’t known to be contradictory.
But what is this claim? As best I can tell, it is that there is a self which contains or is composed of two or more selves. But this point, even if correct, is
of no aid to Hasker’s ST, for at the end of this piece, he tells us that
In view of the indissoluble unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the
work of creation and redemption, it is appropriate in some contexts to refer
to the Trinity as a whole as if to a single person or agent.52

That “as if” is important. The Trinity, for him, is not itself a self, though
it can be thought of, and talked about as if it were. Hasker tacitly admits,
then, that the analogies are not apt, for the mental patients in question are
selves—it is one human self who checks in the hospital and is treated for
her multiple personality disorder. And it is one human self who endures
the effects of having her corpus callosum severed. But then, if Hasker’s
interpretation of these phenomena is reasonable, it would support the
possibility of something irrelevant to his ST—that a self may contain or be
composed of others.
In the end, I can’t discern why Hasker thinks his theory is monotheistic,
other than, that it just must be, since it is meant to be an orthodox theory.
I understand the three selves, but I don’t see why anyone should hold
them to in some sense be (be parts of? constitute?) one god. I can see why
you might think they’re one thing, one entity. After all, it is plausible that
non-universal natures, or non-universal properties of any kind, can’t be
shared by multiple things. So whatever “things” have a particular nature,
such as Bill’s humanity—things like Bill Hasker, and Mrs. Hasker’s husband—must be one and the same. But I take it these Three can’t be one
in that way (numerically one) as they differ, Hasker would say, in their
properties of origin—none (Father), Father (Son), Father-and-Son (Spirit).
And even if one jettisons the generation and procession claims, they will
differ in other ways.
What does monotheism require anyway? “Monotheism” is the view
that there’s only one god. The lowercase “god” is a fairly vague word, but
in the relevant sense, which implies being a proper object of worship, it
entails being a self.53 As Samuel Clarke observes,
worship [is] nothing else, but the acknowledgement or payment of due
honor, correspondent to the true dominion and dignity of the person to
whom it is paid . . . for all worship or honor is personal, paid not to a metaphysical substance, but to an intelligent agent.54

Ibid., number 5, emphasis added.
In the sense relevant, I mean, to Christian, devotional spirituality. In certain theoretical contexts, there is talk of a “God” or “god” which is not a self. See notes 3 and 46 above.
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Even Hasker’s characterization of Old Testament monotheism, on which
this one god is the creator, implies that this one god is some self or other,
creation being an intentional action.55 But Hasker counsels that
Christian thinkers ought to maintain a certain openness in their understanding of the unity of God . . . [not] prematurely adopt[ing] a definition
of divine unity that may cause a problem when it comes time to state the
doctrine of the Trinity.56

In particular, he urges, it needn’t be “acceptable also to Jews.” But why
not? The Jews (whether we mean first-century Jews, like the authors of
the New Testament, or later Jews) either have or haven’t remained faithful
to divine revelation on this score. If they have, and one’s conception of
divine unity is inconsistent with their view, then we’re holding later revelation not merely to complete or disambiguate early revelation, but we’re
holding the two to strictly contradict. This is not, I take it, the Christian
doctrine of progressive revelation, but rather something like the controversial Islamic doctrine of abrogation.57 If the Jews have not been faithful
to divine revelation regarding monotheism, then let’s say what they’ve
misunderstood or wrongly added to it, so as to make clear that our Trinity
theory is consistent with what the Jewish scriptures (which are also ours)
say about Yahweh. Hasker’s advice here regarding “monotheism” is mere
special pleading on behalf of his controversial theory.
Help from the Competition?
But might we gain any clarity from Hasker’s interaction with two other
highly creative philosophical theologians—authors of rival theories who
are also important critics of ST, Brian Leftow and Michael Rea? Leaving
aside the dialectic Hasker has with each, what positive lessons for ST does
he draw from their work?
From Rea, Hasker adopts a concept of constitution, as in: “A batch of
clay constitutes a pot.”58 The basic idea is that one thing may constitute
multiple other things of a different sort. In Hasker’s hands, the constitution relation is no longer part of a relative-identity approach (i.e., one
which depends on a controversial concept of numerical sameness which
is not absolute identity), and constitution relations are asymmetric. He
admits it to be unclear quite what “constitution” means in this new, nonphysical context, but presumably he’ll say that the meaning is analogous
to more familiar material cases.59 Hasker suggests,

“How to Think About the Trinity,” number 1.
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(London: SCM Press, 2003), 64–69, 74–75.
58
William Hasker, “Constitution and the Trinity,” 12.
59
Ibid., 329n9.
55
56

HASKER’S QUESTS FOR A VIABLE SOCIAL THEORY

185

Each of the Persons, we may say, is constituted by the divine nature but is not
identical with that nature. And in virtue of the fact that each of the Persons is
constituted by the divine nature, each Person is God (though not, to be sure,
is a God, an assertion which has consistently been avoided by the Trinitarian tradition).60

This requires some exposition. Hasker glosses the phrase “each of the Persons is in himself God” as meaning that the “divine attributes . . . belong to
each Person fully.”61 So by saying that each “is God” (a confusing phrase,
given the name-like quality of the capitalized English “God”) he means
that each is divine, which amounts to each having the divine nature. Each,
he says, “is wholly God, but not the whole of God.” Less confusingly: each
is divine, but none is the only divine thing. Or equivalently: each has the
concrete divine nature, but is not the only thing which has the concrete
divine nature.
Again, the monotheism slips away. A divine thing, or a thing which has
the divine nature, is by definition a god, and there are (at least) three gods
on Hasker’s theory, even given his prohibition of saying, e.g., of the Son,
that he is “a god.” He wants to say, I think, that something which has the
one, concrete, divine nature is “the God.” Let him say it; nonetheless, he’s
posited three numerically distinct things which enjoy this condition. As
we’ve seen, each of his divine persons qualitatively differs from the other
two, and is therefore numerically other than both of his fellow divinities.
But perhaps there is help to be had in Brian Leftow’s creative speculations on the subject. Hasker, I think correctly, congratulates Leftow’s
theory on its preservation of monotheism.62 In the paper in question Leftow
suggests that the each “person” in the Trinity is, at bottom, God living his
life in a certain way.63 But why is it monotheistic? Hasker observes, “In
Leftow’s proposal there is just one divine being; there is a single person
who is God.”64 Indeed—God is a god and the only god. In the ancient near
east and throughout the Bible a god is by definition some sort of super self.
Ibid., 329, original emphases.
“Objections to Social Trinitarianism,” 434.
62
Ibid., 435.
63
See my “Trinity,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition), ed. Edward N.
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/trinity/, section 2.1. In a later work,
Leftow goes farther, arguing that the “persons” of the Trinity are truly selves, but selves
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So if there is exactly one god, there is exactly one super self of some sort.
Hasker suggests that Leftow’s theory could stand a little adjustment—instead of God being one self living his life in three “strands,” Hasker says,
“we simply posit a distinct subject of experience for each of the strands.”65
And by “distinct subject,” he of course means a divine self, a god, so we’re
back to tritheism.
For all Hasker’s confidence in asserting “the” doctrine of the Trinity,
it seems that he’s unclear about just what that doctrine is. It is sobering
that someone as informed, able, and serious as Hasker is struggling in
this way. Nor is he a bold speculator or a crank; to the contrary, he’s wellversed in ancient and recent catholic theology, and he patiently tries to
mine insights from recent work by some of our ablest Christian philosophers. Despite his open theism, he’s very confident that divine providence
has lead mainstream, catholic Christianity along a correct path here. In his
view, this path is, or at least eventually led to, ST. Hasker doesn’t make
the anachronistic claim that these theologians asserted ST, but he wants to
be, as it were, walking further down the same paths. Whether he actually
succeeds in this is another matter.66
Conclusion
We should not take Hasker’s advice on “How to Think About the Trinity.”
While it’s been observed that views advertised as “social trinitarianism”
make it “sound equivalent to the thesis that the Doctrine of the Trinity is
true but modalism is false,”67 Hasker is clearer; he stipulates that the real
core of ST is just the three, co-equal divine selves. This certainly has, in
recent times, been a popular idea or image: a loving community of divine
friends. We should be grateful that Hasker has vigorously, carefully, and
systematically pursued a precise theoretical articulation of this.
But I’ve argued that Hasker has succeeded only in constructing a new
version of polytheism. His theory features three gods, which must be
numerically different because they’re qualitatively different. Hasker tries
to cover this abundance of gods with a fig leaf of monotheistic language
and a smokescreen of analogy appeals. Hasker asserts that there is “one
only living and true God,”68 but as we’ve seen, it turns out that “God”
here is a group of gods which is itself somewhat self-like. We can’t say
that he clearly and consistently asserts monotheism—that there is exactly
one being like the Yahweh of Isaiah, one true god. He does theorize that
Ibid., 436.
In a longer version of this paper, I argued here that he fails in this; I show that some of
the theologians he appeals to are hopelessly un- and implicitly anti-ST. This cut section is
available online as “Historical supplement to ‘Hasker’s Quests for a Viable Social Theory’
(Dale),” http://trinities.org/blog/?p=4142.
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these divine selves share a particular property, a nature, which implies
that they are one and the same—one and the same god, but also (contrary
to both Hasker’s intentions and the New Testament) one and the same self.
If there is no other particular divine nature, then the account would imply
monotheism. But that’s not good enough; it’s agreed all around (or nearly
so—inconsistency has its fans) that a successful Trinity theory must imply
monotheism without also implying polytheism.69
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